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alism, or even pragmatism and intellectualism. Of course this does not mean that those individuals who defend the new realism are without convictions on these matters, but only that as a basis for their clearer discussion it is first of all essential to get rid of subjectivism.

Like most new things this new theory is in essentials very old. To understand its meaning it is necessary to go back beyond Kant, beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and Descartes—far back to that primordial common sense which believes in a world that exists independently of the knowing of it, but believes also that that same independent world can be directly presented in consciousness and not merely represented or copied by “ideas.” In short, the new realism is almost identical with that naïve or natural realism which was the first of our three typical theories of the knowledge relation; and as such, it should be sharply distinguished from the dualistic or inferential realism of the Cartesians.

Now the cause of the abandonment of naïve realism in favor of the dualistic or picture theory was the apparently hopeless disagreement of the world as presented in immediate experience with the true or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. It follows that the first and greatest problem for the new realists is to amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it compatible with the universal phenomenon of error and with the mechanism of perception upon which that phenomenon is based and in terms of which it must be interpreted.

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DISCUSSION

OPPOSITION AS CONDITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

IN No. 16 of this volume Professor Walter B. Pitkin was kind enough to give a critical abstract of five essays published by me in the last years, all expounding one system of thought, based on the principle that opposition is the spring of consciousness. I feel very thankful to Professor Pitkin for the pains he took in drawing a very vivid and generally true picture of the line of thought I pursued, and I am glad that he finds me at least on the trail to truth, although my path diverges by a large angle from the psychological highroad.

Indeed Professor Pitkin raises only one objection to the system contained in my writings, although, to be sure, that objection is

directed against its very foundation. My critic says that either I mean by opposition that specific kind which exists between antithetical pairs, as for instance light and dark, or yellow and blue, as he generously puts it to make my situation easier, or that I understand opposition only in that broader sense of mutual exclusion which exists, for instance, between all colors. In the first case I must succumb to the difficulty that to most objects an antithetical pair can not be designated; in the second, opposition could not carry the system built upon it, because "anything could be a sufficient precondition for the experiencing of anything else"; "a sound, or a flavor, or a perfume, or any conceivable object with three sides, would all be equally efficient as 'contraries' with regard to a triangle."

Professor Pitkin takes into consideration both branches of this alternative, but he decidedly represents me as having spoken in the former sense. Indeed, according to him, I assume "a polarizing tendency in the world-stuff itself, which gives rise to all intellectual distinctions," and he asks me to inform my readers (who would otherwise not be convinced) as to just what qualities (physical objects) do operate in antithetical pairs to effect consciousness.

I think, however, and I am sorry that I must say so, that it is clearly the second sense of Professor Pitkin's alternative in which the term "opposition" is used in my writings. In formulating against current psychology the charge mentioned by Professor Pitkin, that out of isolated perceptions (viz., such as have not a content of opposition against other perceptions) induction, experience of certain facts having certain consequences, and rational action can not arise, I manifestly take opposition in the sense of mutual exclusion only, since to establish such a charge no conception of polar antithesis is necessary. Indeed, in the very quotation which Professor Pitkin, in elucidating this charge, kindly takes from my writings, the terms *Gegensatz* and *Ausschliessung* are used together, separated only by a comma, with the precise intention of precluding the interpretation in the sense of polar antithesis—the former term, however, being generally preferred in my writings in order to demonstrate that at the root of consciousness there is dynamic opposition (which, of course, is not identical with "polar antithesis"). If this interpretation is given to my principle, then it does follow that anything is a sufficient precondition for the experiencing of anything else. But this is just my opinion. Anything is, however, according to the theory I propose, the sufficient precondition for the experiencing of anything else with regard only to that element of the latter which is contained in it on that ground, that *fundamentum divisionis*, on which the two are opposed to, or exclude, each other. So a sound or

a flavor or a perfume makes us experience a (seen) triangle only as light, a lighting, or visible object.

Let us suppose a baby just born in a room free from sound and odor; let us exclude for simplicity's sake all tactual and gustatory, etc., impressions also, and let us suppose that a shining triangle is held before his eyes. The light of the triangle is not light to him in the same sense as it is to us, as, namely, one sort of thing; but it is to him *the* something, the stirring, the powerful, as opposed to the nothing, the quiet, the weak (namely, the dark), which environed him in his mother's womb, unperceived then because not yet opposed to the impression of light, but now, in consequence of the actual opposition, remembered. Such a baby would have no experience of light as distinguished from something. Let us now suppose that later a noise arises in his neighborhood. He takes notice of "something again," which is "not the same," however, as that perceived until now, and he arrives at the notion of light or the visible as distinguished from another something.¹ To experience the visible as a triangle, the opposition between planes having different outlines, or at least the opposition between numbers, must be brought to his perception; or, let us say, with regard to this example, more generally to his mind, as mathematical and geometrical conceptions can be formed *a priori*. But this again does not mean a polar antithesis, but only a mutual exclusion on another ground. Between specific opposition (polar antithesis) and chaotic exclusion, which Professor Pitkin opposes to each other, there is an intermediate sort of relation which is not restricted to pairs and might be called specific exclusion.

To sum up: Everybody is aware that rational action requires a systematical knowledge of things, their division into classes, the division of every such class into sub-classes, and so on. What I assert is that *consciousness is from the very beginning consciousness of system*,

¹ I foresee that readers unfamiliar with the writings here spoken of will find great difficulty in understanding the asserted difference between perception of light as perception of the something and its perception as perception of light. To remove this difficulty, I am obliged to refer to my writings, where, especially in "Das Beharren, etc.," I try to show throughout the whole psychology how such differences work. Here I can only say that this difference is like that between perception of a tone simply as a tone and its perception as a high or a low tone. This difference, and the assertion that if only one tone (and silence) has impressed the subject so far in his lifetime, then only the former perception is possible to him, will perhaps more easily find acceptance than the corresponding assertion with regard to light. And I can further point to the fact that, whereas in the case when light would be the only (positive) sensation which has impressed a subject, it would give him, as was said, the perception of the powerful; in cases of other (positive) sensations also having already been experienced, this light would give, on the contrary, the perception of the tenderest, finest thing of all.

which only develops in the course of life; consciousness not only of "this," but also of "therefore not being that."

It is this idea which leads to that psychophysical theory (I can not allow that it is a "hypothesis" only) which Professor Pitkin somewhat approvingly reviews.

The opposition, therefore, from which this theory derives consciousness, is nothing else but what other psychological theories call difference of stimuli. These theories, however, do not find the actions of different stimuli or their residua leading to dynamical conflicts in the subject,² and they do not see in such conflicts the very condition of consciousness, as I do. This is my answer to the request for information with which Professor Pitkin closes his review.

I may perhaps be allowed to mention that W. Polowzow, after having rather favorably reviewed my treatise "Das Beharren," etc.,³ later, in a criticism of "Die Stelle des Bewusstseins," etc.,⁴ finds the same difficulty with my theory as Professor Pitkin. Fräulein Polowzow mentions that I oppose to "seeing a dog" "seeing no dog," and thinks that if this example is taken as typical of the sense of opposition in my works, my theory of the origin of consciousness is reduced *ad absurdum*. Now, I can not see why. "Seeing a dog" means seeing a particular form. What I maintain is that consciousness of a form is impossible without more than one form being known to the subject, and that consequently the consciousness of the form called a dog can not arise in a subject without his knowing at least one other form not called a dog. This may be false, but I can not see why it should be absurd.

I can not see the absurdity, although this agreement between two (by no means all) of my critics induced me to think the matter over seriously once more. Their agreement seems to me to arise simply from the influence of current psychology, which prevents those used to it from seeing the dependence which I assert. Indeed I know of only one systematic treatise on psychology (the "Leitfaden" of Th. Lipps) which mentions negative perceptions, such as that of seeing no dog, although such perceptions manifestly form the very starting-point of thought. But the psychology of to-day might justly be called the science of mind apart from its coherence.

I close by expressing once more my best thanks to Professor Pitkin.

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² Th. Lipps ("Von Fühlen, Wollen und Denken," second edition) does derive dynamical conflicts in the subject from this difference, but at the same time he calls this difference opposition, *Gegensatz*, *Gegensatzlichkeit*, just as I do.

³ *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Bd. 55, S. 154, 1910.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Bd. 58, S. 388, 1911.